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THE LHC BEAM LOSS MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
An unprecedented amount of energy will be stored in the circulating beams of LHC. The loss of even a very
small fraction of a beam may induce a quench in the superconducting magnets or cause physical damage to
machine components. A fast (one turn) loss of 3 · 10-9 and a constant loss of 3 · 10-12 times the nominal beam
intensity can quench a dipole magnet. A fast loss of 3 · 10-6 times nominal beam intensity can damage a
magnet. The stored energy in the LHC beam is a factor of 200 (or more) higher than in existing hadron
machines with superconducting magnets (HERA, TEVATRON, RHIC), while the quench levels of the LHC
magnets are a factor of about 5 to 20 lower than the quench levels of these machines. To comply with these
requirements the detectors, ionisation chambers and secondary emission monitors are designed very reliable
with a large operational range. Several stages of the acquisition chain are doubled and frequent functionality
tests are automatically executed. The failure probabilities of single components were identified and
optimised. First measurements show the large dynamic range of the system.
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Abstract
An unprecedented amount of energy will be stored in
the circulating beams of LHC. The loss of even a very
small fraction of a beam may induce a quench in the su-
perconducting magnets or cause physical damage to ma-
chine components. A fast (one turn) loss of 3 · 10−9 and
a constant loss of 3 · 10−12 times the nominal beam inten-
sity can quench a dipole magnet. A fast loss of 3 · 10−6
times nominal beam intensity can damage a magnet. The
stored energy in the LHC beam is a factor of 200 (or more)
higher than in existing hadron machines with supercon-
ducting magnets (HERA, TEVATRON, RHIC), while the
quench levels of the LHC magnets are a factor of about 5
to 20 lower than the quench levels of these machines. To
comply with these requirements the detectors, ionisation
chambers and secondary emission monitors are designed
very reliable with a large operational range. Several stages
of the acquisition chain are doubled and frequent function-
ality tests are automatically executed. The failure probabil-
ities of single components were identified and optimised.
First measurements show the large dynamic range of the
system.
ARCHITECTURE OF THE BLM SYSTEM
Detectors
Figure 1: Photograph of the inside of an ionisation cham-
ber. The stack of aluminum electrodes with the insulator
ceramics at both ends can be seen.
Signal speed and robustness against aging were the main
design criteria for the detectors. Due to the high dynamic
range two types of detectors will be used. The standard
monitors are ionisation chambers with parallel aluminum
electrode plates separated by 0.5 cm, as shown in Figure
1. The detectors are 50 cm long with a diameter of 9 cm
and a sensitive volume of 1.5 liter. The collection time of
the electrons and ions is of the order of 300 ns and 80 μs
respectively. The chambers are filled with N2 at 100 mbar
overpressure. The composition of the chamber gas is the
only component in the BLM system which is not remotely
monitored. In order to overcome this limitation the proper-
ties of the chamber gas were chosen to be sufficiently close
to air at ambient pressure (i.e. inside a detector which has
developed a leak) not to compromise the precision of the
BLM system, but sufficiently different to detect a leak dur-
ing the scheduled annual test of all the chambers with a
radioactive source.
At locations with very high (potential) loss rates (about
300) the ionisation chambers will be complemented by sec-
ondary emission monitors (see Figure 2). They are based
Figure 2: Photograph of the inside of a secondary emis-
sion detector. The stack of two aluminium and one titanium
electrodes are mounted with insulating support.
on the same design, but hold only three electrodes. The sig-
nal (middle) electrode is made out of titanium, because its
secondary emission coefficient shows better stability to the
integrated dose increases [1]. This chamber is 10 cm long,
and pressure inside has to stay below 10−7 bar. To keep
the vacuum over the foreseen life span of 20 years a NEG
pumping strip of 300 cm2 is mounted inside the container.
The sensitivity is about a factor of 3 · 104 smaller than in
the ionisation chamber.
Both chambers are operated at 1.5 kV and are equipped
with a low pass filter at the high voltage input. The com-
bined dynamic range of the detectors is higher than 10 9.
It is limited for the ionisation chamber by leakage currents
through the insulator ceramics at the lower end and by sat-
uration due to space charge at the upper end. The lower end
limitation for the secondary emission detector is given by
parasitic ionisation outside of the chamber at the location
of feedthroughs and connectors. The high end limitations
are unknown.
The estimated radiation dose on the detectors during 20
years of LHC operation is 2 · 108 Gray in the collimation
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sections and 2·104 Gray at the other locations. To minimise
the radiation aging effects (etc. electronegative gases, or-
ganic compounds) a strict cleaning procedure for the cham-
bers is followed (including glow discharge cleaning for the
collimation section detectors). Impurity levels due to ther-
mal and radiation induced desorption are estimated to stay
in the ppm range. No organic material is present, neither in
the production process (pumping, baking and filling) of the
detectors, nor in the detectors themselves.
The positioning of the detectors was determined by sim-
ulation studies. In the arcs, three monitors per beam will be
installed around each quadrupole located in the horizontal
plane defined by the beam vacuum tubes (see Figure 3).
At this position the secondary particle fluence is highest
and the best separation of the losses from the two beams is
reached. Their longitudinal positions are about 1 m down-
stream of the most likely loss locations.
Figure 3: The location of the BLMs outside of the cryostat
at the plane of the vacuum chambers. At the LHC arc two
detectors are on the quadrupole magnets (white) and one
on the adjacent bending magnet (blue).
Acquisition System
The electrical signals of the detectors are digitized with a
current to frequency converter and these pulses are counted
over a period of 40 μs (see Figure 4). The counter value is
transmitted every 40 μs to the surface analysis electronics
using a high speed optical link (with a cyclic redundancy
check). The signal treatment and transmission chain is dou-
bled after the current to frequency conversion to meet the
required failure rate probability of 10−7 to 10−8 per hour.
The surface electronics calculates the integrated loss values
and compares them to a table of loss duration and beam en-
ergy depended threshold values. Warning information is
transmitted by a software protocol. The beam abort signals
are transmitted to the beam dump kicker magnets using the
LHC beam interlock system (LBIS). The beam energy in-
formation is received over a dedicated fiber link. Details to
the readout system can be found in [2] and [5].
The analog electronics is located below the quadrupole
magnets in the arc. For all detectors of the dispersion sup-
pressor and the long straight sections the electronics is lo-
cated in side tunnels to the LHC. All components of the
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Figure 4: Schematic view of the signal transmission chain
and the BLM installation around one arc quadrupole.
dose expected at the electronics locations is about 20 Gray
per year. The analog signal transmission cables have a
length of a few meters in the LHC arcs and up to 500 m
in the long straight sections. This part of the transmission
is subject to the injection of electromagnetic crosstalk and
noise.
The availability of all electronics channels is constantly
monitored and radiation dose induced drifts in the elec-
tronic channels are corrected (up to a maximum level,
which corresponds to 10% of the lowest beam abort thresh-
old value). The availability of all detectors, the acquisition
chains and the generation and communication of the beam
abort signal is verified for each channel before each injec-
tion into the LHC.
The BLM system will drive an online event display and
write extensive online logging (at a rate of 1 Hz) and post-
mortem data (up to 20000 turns plus averages of up to
10 minutes) to a database for offline analysis.
Failure Rate and Availability
Figure 5: Relative probability of a system component being
responsible for a damage to a LHC magnet in the case of a
loss.
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Figure 6: Loss measurements as function of time at the SPS beam dump.
The measurement system failure rate and the availability
requirements have been evaluated using the Safety Integrity
Level (SIL) approach [4]. A downtime cost evaluation is
used as input for the SIL approach. The beam loss monitor
system’s responce is critical for short and intense particle
losses, while at medium and longer loss durations it is as-
sisted by the quench protection system and the cryogenic
system. The required probability of not detecting a danger-
ous beam loss, and therefore losing a magnet, is 10−3 per
year, which corresponds to SIL3. The unavailability of the
BLM system has been calculated (using the program Reli-
ability Workbench V10.0, ISOGRAPH) to be 5 · 10−6 per
channel. Assuming 100 dangerous losses per year satisfies
the SIL3 requirement, the required probability of generat-
ing a false dump is calculated to be 10−6 to 10−7 per hour
(SIL 2) per channel. This corresponds to 20 false dumps
per year. The simulation of the BLM system yields 10 to
17 false beam aborts per year, again satisfying the SIL2 re-
quirement. A detailed record of the reliability calculations
for the BLM system and for the whole LHC can be found
in [3, 5] and [6] respectively.
To identify the weakness of safety system components a
relative comparison is shown in Figure 5. In the LHC de-
sign the ionisation chambers and their cabling contributes
most to the un-safety of the system. Even with no dam-
age in 30 years of the ionisation chamber operation, sys-
tems which are redundant and frequently checked, con-
tribute less to the un-safety. The availability of the system
is decreased by false dumps. The components of the beam
loss system which are most responsible for these dumps
are located in the very front end of the signal treatment
chain, which are not redundant. For the LHC design that
is the discharge switch of the integrator in the current to
frequency converter.
TEST MEASUREMENTS
The complete system is being tested at HERA (DESY)
and SPS (CERN) beam dumps. At HERA mainly the
shower simulation are checked and at the SPS a comparison
will be done between the ionisation chambers and the sec-
ondary emission detectors. The SPS allows to test the de-
tectors over a large dynamic range with a pulsed beam (see
Figure 6). At 1900 seconds the evolution of radiation at
the dump is seen under nominal fixed target operation. At
2050 s the full beam is dumped intentionally showing im-
mediately an increase in the remnant radiation level which
is steadily decaying with time. These plots illustrate the ap-
pearing radiation level ranging over 4 orders of magnitude.
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